Files
opencode-rails/lib/opencode/impostor.rb
Ajay Krishnan 69cfff55b2 Port lib/opencode/rails/ source files; strip Rails.event/Rails.error
Eleven source files moved from ajent-rails:lib/opencode/rails/ to
opencode-rails:lib/opencode/ (flat layout — modules are Opencode::*, not
Opencode::Rails::*; matches opencode-ruby).

  artifact.rb           63 LOC
  exchange.rb           77 LOC
  impostor.rb           48 LOC
  message_artifacts.rb 133 LOC
  sandbox_file.rb       81 LOC
  sandbox.rb            71 LOC
  session.rb           168 LOC
  tool_display.rb      423 LOC
  transform.rb          77 LOC
  turn.rb              642 LOC
  uploaded_files_prompt.rb 85 LOC
  ----
  total              1,868 LOC

Surgical Rails strips:

  exchange.rb:
    Rails.event.notify(name, payload)
      -> Opencode::Instrumentation.instrument(name, payload) { }

  message_artifacts.rb (1 call), turn.rb (6 calls):
    Rails.error.report(error, **opts)
      -> Opencode::ErrorReporter.report(error, **opts)

Comments/docstrings referencing Rails.error.report / Rails.event left
in place — they document how to wire the host adapter.

ActiveSupport core_ext requires expanded in lib/opencode-rails.rb to
cover Numeric#seconds, Hash#deep_stringify_keys, String#squish/truncate,
String#demodulize. Bundle install + smoke load confirms all 12
gem-provided constants resolve cleanly.
2026-05-20 05:14:00 -07:00

49 lines
1.8 KiB
Ruby

# frozen_string_literal: true
module Opencode
# An ActiveStorage::Attachment on an assistant message that uses a
# trusted Transform's destination filename but fails the transform's
# `#trusted?` predicate. In plain English: a same-named attachment
# that wasn't produced by the host-trusted renderer pipeline.
#
# Where impostors come from:
#
# 1. A previous job retry attached the destination filename via the
# tool-extracted path (the agent wrote a file with that name and
# it landed before the trusted render did).
# 2. A pre-substrate code path persisted an agent-authored HTML file
# with the destination filename (the historical AIGL exploit
# surface that motivated the trust boundary in the first place).
# 3. A previous transform version stamped different metadata and the
# trust check now correctly rejects it.
#
# The Impostor knows how to remove itself. The orchestrator just asks
# "are there impostors of this transform on this message?" and tells
# each one to `purge!`. Purging is a verb that belongs to the
# impostor — it's the noun whose state the purge mutates.
class Impostor
# Finds impostors of `transform` on `message` — attachments whose
# filename matches the transform's destination but whose contents
# fail the transform's trust predicate.
def self.for(message:, transform:)
target = transform.destination_filename
message.artifacts
.select { |a| a.filename.to_s == target }
.reject { |a| transform.trusted?(a) }
.map { |a| new(attachment: a) }
end
def initialize(attachment:)
@attachment = attachment
end
def purge!
@attachment.purge
end
def filename
@attachment.filename.to_s
end
end
end